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Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases
DARIUSH KEYHANIt
INTRODUCTION

Historically, the U.S. courts have almost as a matter of course upheld
the presumption of a permanent injunction when finding infringement of a
valid patent.' However, the U.S. Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., revisited this long-standing relationship between the
exclusive right conferred by patents and the right to injunctive relief. 2 In
an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court overturned 3 a long line
of Federal Circuit cases that applied the "general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstance." 4 The Court held that the "well-established principles of
equity" require a plaintiff to satisfy the four-factor test before a court may
grant permanent injunctive relief and that these principles should "apply
with equal force" to disputes arising under the Patent Act. 5 According to the
four-factor test, "a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
t LL.M. Candidate (2009), New York University School of Law; J.D., State University
of New York at Buffalo School of Law; M.S., Molecular Immunology, University of
Rochester School of Medicine; B.A., cum laude, M.S. Ed., University of Rochester. Mr.
Keyhani is a founding member of the law firm of Meredith & Keyhani, PLLC, a New York
and New Jersey law firm that focuses its practice on litigation and consulting in all areas of
intellectual property law.
I See, e.g., Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (holding
that it was the essence of the patent to exclude others without question of motive); see also,
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 554 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
("[F]rom at least the early 19th Century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding
of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases."); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 388 (2006).
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (2005), vacated, 547
U.S. 388 (2006).
5 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
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irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4)6 that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction."
Although the majority in eBay held that the issuance of a permanent
injunction would need to be decided on the equities on a case-by-case basis
upon consideration of the four factors, 7 a survey of the district courts'
interpretation of the decision over the past two years reveals that the courts
have for the most part adopted the approach advocated by Justice Kennedy
in his concurring opinion. 8 The lower courts have generally considered a
three-tier categorization of patent holder rights: those that participate in the
manufacture and sales of patented products and methods; research and nonprofit institutions that produce patentable inventions; and inventors that
pursue commercialization of the patented inventions by licensing.9 In
almost all of these cases, the district courts have refused to grant permanent
injunctions to patentees in the third group.' 0 Besides the fact that it is
inherently inequitable to discriminate against patentees who choose to
commercialize their inventions in different ways, the preclusion of
permanent injunctive relief to some patentees where the benefit is being
transferred to other private parties is inconsistent with the Takings Clause
of Fifth Amendment' I and U.S. obligations under international intellectual
property agreements, including the World Trade Organization TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). ' 2 Most
significantly, taking away U.S. patentees' rights to permanent injunctive
relief is bad economic policy and undermines the United States' last
economic edge in the global market-innovation and entrepreneurship. The
U.S. Supreme Court should redefine or clarify the scope of permanent
injunctions under 35 U.S.C. § 283. Alternatively, Congress should amend
the Patent Act to provide for a per se right to a permanent injunction where
it has been found that a valid patent has been infringed. The only exception
should be for injunctions that protect public health and safety, and are
Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982)).
7 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring, with whom Stevens, J., Souter, J. and Breyer, J.,
6

joined).
8 See id; see, e.g., Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing
Landscapefor Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 543, 543-72 (2008).

9 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 8.
10 After a search on Westlaw of district court decisions on permanent injunction since
eBay and a review of other commentators' reviews, the author has been unable to identify a
single case since eBay in which a district granted a non-manufacturing, non-competing, or

non-university/non-profit research institution patentee a permanent injunction.
II See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 33 and accompanying text.

Fall 2008]

PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

solely for the purposes of "public use" under an eminent domain type
doctrine with a strict standard of review.

I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN
PATENT CASES

Patent rights are granted in the United States under Article I, Section 8
of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have the power
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."' 13 The first U.S. patent statute was enacted in
May of 179014 and has since undergone many full revisions, most recently
codified in the Patent Act of 1952.15 The current version of the Act
provides that the grant of a patent confers a "right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States" 16 and "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent."' 17 The U.S. Supreme Court traditionally upheld the
right to a permanent injunction where a valid patent was found to have been
infringed. 18 Prior to 1952, the Patent Act defined patent rights as "the
9
exclusive right to make, use and vend the said invention or discovery."' In
1952, the Patent Act redefined the rights conferred from the grant of a
patent as the right to "exclude others from making, using or selling" the
invention. 20 Prior to the Court's decision in eBay, the Federal Circuit, since
its inception in 1982, had interpreted the right to injunctive relief for
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
15 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
17 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (2006).
16

18 See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852); Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v.
E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) ("[S]uch exclusion may be said to have been of
the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of
property to use or not use it, without question of motive.") (citing Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 546 (1902)).
19 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952). The Patent Act
of 1790, the first U.S. patent legislation, conveyed to inventors the "sole and exclusive right
and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others." Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7,
1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
20 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 154, 66 Stat. 792, 804 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006)).
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21
infringement of a valid patent almost as matter of course.

II. CATEGORICAL PRECLUSION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

A. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent
part that, "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 22 Some scholars argue that a prohibition of injunctive relief
where a valid patent has been infringed is inconsistent with a patentee's due
process of law and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 23 To the
extent a patent conveys to a patentee an exclusive property right, the
government's imposition of "unexpected" limitations on this right, i.e.,
allowing a third party infringer or, worse yet, a willful infringer to continue
to infringe a patent, is in effect a de facto private eminent domain
sanctioned by the government. Traditionally, the government has the power
to "take" private property for public interest and "public use" by invoking
the power of eminent domain. 24 Under the "takings" law, the government's
exercise of eminent domain must be for "public use" and the party whose
property is taken must be reasonably compensated for the value of the
property taken. 25 Increasing the profits or economic opportunity of a private
infringer or willful infringer, without evidence of forwarding any legitimate
public interest, has not and should not trigger the power of the
government's eminent domain. 26 Even using the highly contested and
21 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Millard, Note, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases:
Should Courts Apply A Rebuttable Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 985, 993-94 (2008) (("'[A]n injunction should

issue once infringement has been established unless there is sufficient reason for denying
it."') (quoting W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1988))) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (1989)).
22 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution in full provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST.amend. V.
23 See, e.g., Paul M. Schoenhard, Who Took My IP-Defending the Availability of
Injunctive Relief of Patent Owners, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 193 (2008) (citing James
v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881)).
24 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
25 Id.
26 Id.
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controversial low threshold eminent domain standard for private use upheld
by the Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London 2 7 and certainly using a
strict scrutiny standard that the author advocates here, 28 under the facts in
eBay, a permanent injunction should have issued as there was no evidence
of public interest or the kind of "public use" that necessitated a drastic
eminent domain type of "taking" by the government or by a private
company sanctioned by the government.
B. InternationalAgreements
The United States is a signatory to a number of intellectual property
The TRIPS Agreement, the North
agreements, including TRIPS. 2 9
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and corollary agreements were
an attempt to harmonize the intellectual property laws around the world and
30
to establish minimum standards of intellectual property protection.
Among the numerous limitations outlined in the Agreement, TRIPS
prohibits compulsory licensing of patented inventions by member states
absent exceptional circumstances provided under Articles 30 and 31.31
Under Article 30, Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent provided that such exceptions "do not

27 In a highly controversial 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New
London upheld a city's use of the power of eminent domain to transfer private property from
one private property owner to another; the Court held that where a government presents a

"comprehensive development plan" with "public benefits" that are not merely "incidental or
pre-textual," the Court will apply a deferential, rational basis-like standard to determine
whether the asserted public benefit of the taking satisfies the "public use" requirement under
the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005).
28 See, e.g., Jennifer J. Rruekeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything? The
Takings Clause and the Erosion of the "Public Use" Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543,

570 (2002) (arguing for heightened scrutiny of "public use" when private parties receive the
primary benefit of a taking).
29 Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994), [hereinafter
TRIPS]. Other agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
have corollary provisions to those in TRIPs for the protection of intellectual property rights.
See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1701-18, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 670-79 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. For a discussion and background
on international intellectual property agreements and those that the United States is a
signatory, see generally, GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM 0. HENNESSY & SHIRA
PERLMUTTER, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, 35-87 (2001).
30 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1449
(2000).
31 TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 30, 31(h) ("The right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of
the authorization.").
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unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 3the
patent holder, taking
2
account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
The denial of a permanent injunction to patentees whose valid patent
has been found to have been infringed is a denial of the right to exclude and
is a defacto compulsory license. 33 Clearly, the right to exclude others from
using a patentee's invention and the right to choose how and by whom the
patentee wishes to commercialize its invention are all part of the normal
exploitation of a patent. Forcing a patentee to license its patent to a private
party who is infringing the patentee's patent does in fact prejudice the
legitimate interest of a patentee and is arguably inconsistent with U.S.
34
obligations under TRIPS and corollary international agreements.

III. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PATENTEES IS BAD ECONOMICS
In his concurring opinion in eBay, Justice Kennedy advocated for a

restrictive categorization of injunctive relief for patent infringement or
different treatment of patentees based upon economic disposition or
function and the scope of the patented invention where a patented invention
is a component of a larger product with multiple components. In his
opinion, Justice Kennedy advocated against permanent injunctive relief for
patentees who themselves do not practice or manufacture products covered
by their patents and use the injunctive relief as a bargaining power to
35
negotiate exorbitant royalties.
Justice Kennedy's conception of injunctive relief for different
categories of patentees is not in line with the underlying policy interest of
the patent system. 36 Most inventions are improvements of the prior art or
expansions or developments on existing ideas. If one goes down the road
that we are going to reward differently or provide a different incentive

32 TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 30.
33 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the
Supreme Court of the United States' Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, in PATENT LAW
AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 558 (Toshiko Takenaka & Rainer
Moufang eds., 2008).
34 See, e.g., id.
35 Kennedy explained, "An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a

basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For
these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can
be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent." eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396

(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
36 See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolo et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief" InterpretingeBay in
High-Tech Industries with Non-PracticingPatent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 3,

601-02 (2008).
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structure for certain types of "improvements" or inventions there will be a
slippery slope that will undermine the delicate balance underlying patent
law; not to mention that in many cases the full value of an invention and a
patent may not be known early on and may take years to be realized.
There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution intended to
give one set of patentees greater rights or remedies over others. 37 Any shift
in the delicate balance of patent rights should be made by Congress and not
on an ad hoc basis by the judiciary. Legislative amendments to patent
remedies for patentees who serve different economic functions were
unsuccessfully attempted by Congress in 2005.38 The concern raised by
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion regarding cases where a patented
invention is only a small component of a large system should not be
addressed by undermining the delicate incentive structure in patent law, but
rather through the free market. If the patented invention is a "small"
component or part of a larger system or product and it is not so important,
the infringer or would be infringer can choose not to use that part or will
design around that part. When the infringer insists upon using that part,
there is a price for use of that part that should be determined by the market.
If the price is too high, the infringer may design around, use a different part,
or wait for the expiration of the patent. If that part is so valuable that the
infringer cannot innovate around that part, then it is highly inventive, novel,
and non-obvious, and really is not a "small part" but a legitimate and
valuable invention. As the Supreme Court noted:
The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for
buying, selling, working, or using a thing which the public freely
enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus, a monopoly takes something from the

people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed
before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by
39
adding to the sum of human knowledge.

4
The widely held premise of patent law is incentive for innovation 0_

37 See, e.g., Katherine E White, Preserving the Patent Process to Incentivize Innovation
in GlobalEconomy, 2006 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1 (2006).
38 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005).
39 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933).
40 3 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 14:12 & n.20 (4th ed. 2007) (citing E.
Wyndom Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common
Law, 12 LAW Q. REV. 141, 153 (1896)) ("This, then provides the primary purpose behind

United States patent law defining infringement in terms of making, using, offering for sale,
and selling. Overall, the terms are meant to ensure that the patentee is able to control all use
of the invention that are 'commercial,' i.e., that result in the actor deriving economic return
from satisfying demand from consumers for the patented invention in the marketplace."); see
also, Denicolo et al., supra note 36, at 572 (citing KENNETH ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE
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an inventor is given a commercial market advantage or a limited monopoly
for the life of patent as a quid pro quo for the public disclosure of the
invention. From an economics model, the categorical foreclosure of
permanent injunction for a non-practicing and non-manufacturing patentees
leads to economic inefficiencies that undermine the very policy interests
patent law is supposed to forward. There is no economic justification for
unequal or different treatment of patentees. Law and economics scholars
have argued that the point of profit taking does not define the social benefit
of a firm's presence in the marketplace and that diversity in firm structure,
business models, and specialization is generally pro-competitive, enhances
incentives for innovation, and ultimately results in lower prices for the
4
consumers. 1
IV. CHECKS AND BALANCES ON PATENTEES' RIGHTS

There has been an increasing number of legal and regulatory
constraints placed on the rights of patent holders over the past twenty years.
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has come down with a number
of decisions that have reined-in the scope of patentees' rights and remedies.
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 42 and its progeny,
the Court broadened the scope of prosecution history estoppel that narrows
the scope of infringement claims under the doctrine of equivalents. The
Supreme Court in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., raised the bar necessary
for obviousness under § 103 of the Patent Act. 43 This has limited the
number of patents and increased the legitimacy of patents that have been
issued. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., the Court limited the territorial
reach of U.S. patent rights. 44 Just recently, the Federal Circuit has followed
the Supreme Court trend and narrowed the scope of business method
patents. 45
The Supreme Court has long held that the grant of this "special

AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INVENTIONS, IN THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 619 (Richard Nelson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1962).
41 See, e.g., Denicolo et al., supra note 36, at 585-89.
42 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002).
The Supreme Court in Festo held that there is a rebuttable presumption that by making a
narrowing amendment to a patent claim during prosecution, the patentee surrendered all
subject matter between the original and the narrowed claim language. The Court further held
that the patentee can overcome this presumption by showing: (1) that the equivalent at issue
was unforeseeable when the claim amendment was made; (2) that the amendment made
bears only a tangential relationship to the equivalent; or (3) there was some other reason that
the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the alleged equivalent. Id.
43 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
44 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,438-40 (2007).
45 See In re Bilski, 264 Fed. App'x 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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46
privilege of patent monopoly" carries with it a duty to the public interest.
There are also other areas of the law that protect against overreaching and
47
unfair competitive enforcement of patent rights including patent misuse
and antitrust laws 4 8 that protect the public against abuse of the patent
holder's legal "monopoly." Patent misuse laws make attempts by patent
holders to improperly expand the scope or term of a patent illegal, 49 and
antitrust laws 50 protect against patent holders who engage in unfair
competition. Prohibiting some patentees from excluding others from using
their patented invention is not a reasonable means of regulating patent
rights, but rather undermines the very existence of the right itself.

V.

THE PATENTEE'S RIGHT TO AN INJUNCTION

The framers of the Constitution nowhere indicated that remedies for
patent infringement should be different depending on the market function of
the patentee. 5 1 It is well settled that there is no requirement that the patentee
commercialize its invention and the Patent Act no longer confers upon its
owner the right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell its invention, but only the
right to exclude others. Just the same as real property owners may exclude
others from entering their property, but are not forced to rent a vacant
property at any price, a patent grants the right to exclude others from
entering their property and creates no obligation to sell or license (akin to
rent) that property. Indeed, the Patent Act itself provides that "patents shall
have the attributes of personal property," 52 including the "right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention."5 3 The
sole remedy for infringement of a patent is "remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent." 54 When a patentee seeks to enforce his right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention, they must seek remedy by civil action. The only means of
ensuring compliance with the Patent Act that grants the right to exclude

46 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); Preformed Line
Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 279 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 846
(1964).
47 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
48 See, e.g., U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (1995) available at http://www.ftc.govl
bc/0558.pdf; United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
49 See, e.g., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
50 See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
51 See, e.g., Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).

52 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
53 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).

54 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
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others from making, using or selling an invention is to issue an injunction
prohibiting infringers from making, using, or selling an invention. 55 Merely
compensating a patentee does not ensure compliance with the Patent Act as
it does not prevent the infringer from making, using, or selling an
invention.

56

Foreclosing a patentee's right to injunctive relief undermines the very
essence of the rights conferred by a patent-i.e., the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the patented invention. A permanent
injunction therefore presents an unusual and exceptional situation that
justifies a departure from the general rule. As the Federal Circuit has
summarized, because "'[t]he right to exclude recognized in a patent is but
the essence of the concept of property,"' the general rule is that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.5 7
One hundred years ago, the Supreme Court in Cont'l Paper Bag Co. best
clarified the relationship between a patent right and remedy in the form of
injunctive relief:
From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his
remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain
its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything
but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the
patentee. If the conception of the law that a judgment in an action at
law is reparation for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass
that is the ground of the action. There may be other trespasses and
continuing wrongs and the vexation of many actions. These are well-

recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, especially in patent cases,
and a citation of cases is unnecessary. Whether, however, as case
cannot arise where, regarding the situation of the parties in view of the
public interest, a court of equity5might
be justified in withholding relief
8
by injunction, we do not decide.
The practicing and manufacturing patentee is not the only legitimate
participant in the market of innovation and ideas. When modem
conceptions of patent law were developing during the Industrial Revolution
in the United States, businesses did not often engage in research and
55 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395.
56 Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged this closely intertwined

relationship between a

patent right and remedy. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("[T]his 'long
tradition of equity practice' is not surprising, given the difficulty of protecting a right to
exchde through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against the
patentee's wishes-a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of the traditional
four factor test.").
57 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
58 See Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908).
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development, and it was commonplace for independent inventors to obtain
59
patents they would license to those with the resources to commercialize.
Diversity and specialization in the market are also relevant today where an
individual inventor may have a patented invention and may be trying to
come up with the resources to commercialize its invention or seeking
partnership with those who have the manufacturing resources. Patentees
should be able to choose how and with whom they wish to commercialize
their innovation and the free market should determine their rewards and
compensation for the patented invention. The patentee should not be forced
to license its patented inventions to infringers at arbitrary court mandated
rates.
Patentees are granted the exclusive rights to their discoveries in
exchange for publishing and disclosing their invention. In this way,
inventors are incentivized to disclose their ideas, science, and useful arts
progress as a result. The laws governing injunctions should flow from the
rights granted by a patent and should be in line with international laws
regarding intellectual property. To do otherwise would upset the very quid
pro quo that the Patent Act was intended to provide. Upon a finding of
patent infringement, a permanent injunction should issue for all categories
of patentees, unless the injunction would be contrary to public interests
such as public health and safety as defined by the Federal Circuit
precedent. 60 Permanent injunctions should be denied for "public use" under
an eminent domain type doctrine where real property is taken by the
government for public use, but only under a strict standard of review.
CONCLUSION

Consider what would happen if countries around the world would
grant compulsory licenses to domestic infringers and willful infringers of
U.S. companies' foreign patents and the courts in these countries would
decide the appropriate compensation-how would this advance patent
policy or U.S. economic interest? The Supreme Court in eBay realigned the
scope of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. The lower courts'
adoption of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in eBay and seemingly
categorical restrictions on the issuance of permanent injunctions has
resulted in a disruption in the delicate balance of patent rights in the market
of innovation that is constitutionally suspect and in direct tension with U.S.
59 See, e.g., Denicolo et al., supra note 36, at 585.
60 For example, in the City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., the Seventh Circuit

found plaintiff's patent to have been infringed, but to protect the community's public health,
the court allowed the city to continue to infringe the patent, because if the injunction was
made permanent, the city sewage plant would close and the city would not have any means
for disposal of raw sewage. 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934).
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obligations under TRIPS and corollary international intellectual property
agreements. The right of all patentees to permanent injunctive relief upon a
finding of infringement, regardless of market function or means of
commercialization, must be carefully reconsidered by Congress and the
Supreme Court in future decisions; as Chief Justice Roberts admonished in
his concurring opinion in eBay, "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic" 6 1 and equally important are the public interests that patent law was
mandated by the Constitution to serve-"to promote the progress of science
62
and the useful arts."

61 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
62 Cont'l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 415 (1908) ("The right which a patentee receives does
not need much further explanation. We have seen that it has been the judgment of Congress
from the beginning that the sciences and the useful arts could be best advanced by giving an
exclusive fight to an inventor.").

